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Abstract
We use data from the US airline industry to investigate whether rms that are under
bankruptcy protection, as well as these rmsproduct market rivals, change the quality
of the products they o¤er. We measure the quality of the services o¤ered by a carrier
using ight cancellations and delays, and the age of the aircraft used by the carrier. We
nd that delays and cancelations are less frequent during bankruptcy lings but return
to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the bankrupt rm emerges from bankruptcy. We also
nd that rms use Chapter 11 lings to permanently reduce the age of their eet. We
do not nd evidence of statistically and economically signicant changes by the airlines
competitors along any of the dimensions above.
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1 Introduction
Partly fueled by the deteriorating credit conditions resulting from the nancial turmoil that
began in 2007; corporate bankruptcies in the last few years have soared. The Administrative
O¢ ce of the U.S. Courts reports 12; 863 Chapter 11 lings for the year ending June 30, 2009;
up about 94 percent from the previous year when 6; 513 business led for bankruptcy pro-
tection.1 Attention has traditionally centered on the direct costs of bankruptcy proceedings,
such as legal and administrative expenses, as well as their indirect costs, such as lost sales.2
Much of the current discussion involves the e¤ect of bankruptcy on the rms employees who
might be laid o¤, on the rms suppliers who might face reduced demand, and on consumers
of the bankrupt rm who face a lower quality product or a reduction in the variety of the
products o¤ered by the bankrupt rm. Still, there is no systematic evidence showing whether
or not product market quality changes during and after bankruptcy 3
We use data from the US airline industry to investigate the e¤ect of Chapter 11 lings
on the quality of the products that rms o¤er during a bankruptcy ling and after the
rm emerges from bankruptcy protection. Using a single industry allows us to examine
1Firms ling for bankruptcy protection belong to a wide range of industries, from Lehman Brothers to
the Tribune Group in July and December, 2008 respectively, and Chrysler and GM in April and June 2009;
respectively.
2Franks and Torous (1989), Thorburn (2000), Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006), Hennesy and Whited (2007),
Bebchuk (2002)
3For example, there is anecdotal evicence that during nancial distress rms lower product quality to
reduce production costs and increase prot margins. A famous case is that of Beech-Nut baby food products.
By 1977, the company was struggling nancially . At this point the rm started buying inputs from a new
apple concentrate supplier, Universal Juice Co. This supplier sold its product at up to 25 percent below the
market price. In 1979.the rm was bought by Nestle. By mid 1980, concerns were raised by research scientists
suggesting that the apple juice concentrate supplied by Universal Juice Co. was adulterated. However, the
new management dismissed those concerns and continued buying from Universal Juice Co. The FDA begun
an investigation which revealed that the product that Beech-Nut was then marketing as 100 percent apple
juice was actually made from beet sugar, cane sugar syrup, corn syrup and other ingredients, with little if
any apple juice in the mixture. In November 1986, a federal grand jury indicted Beech-Nut and its top two
executives. Prosecutors claimed that the bogus apple juice cost about 20 percent less to make than real
apple juice. See The New York Times, November 14; 1987 and New York Times, October 31; 1993. For
a brief history of Beech-Nut, see http://www.fundinguniverse.com/company-histories/BeechNut-Nutrition-
Corporation-Company-History.html
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how bankruptcy lings a¤ect the quality of the products while abstracting from potentially
confounding unobserved di¤erences across di¤erent industries. Thus, our analysis is in the
same spirit as Chevalier (1995), who studies the relationship between leverage buyouts and
the pricing behavior of rms and their rivals using cross-section data from the US supermarket
industry.
Several features of the airline industry make it particularly appealing to address the ques-
tion of this paper. First, and foremost, there are clear and objective ways to dene measures
of product quality: ight cancellations, ight delays, and aircraft age.4 Second, there have
been several bankruptcy lings in the industry over the last ten years by rms that inter-
act with di¤erent carriers in distinct markets, and over di¤erent years. This allows us to
identify the e¤ects of bankruptcy on product quality, independent of potentially confounding
market, rm, and time e¤ects. Finally, the airline industry is an oligopoly, and hence we
should expect competitors to react strategically to the choices made by bankrupt rms in
the markets where these rms interact. Competitors might attempt to displace the bankrupt
rm and capture the distressed rms market share by improving product quality. However,
non-bankrupt rms do not enjoy the leeway that bankruptcy grants the insolvent rm, for
example, in terms of lease rejections, and labor contract renegotiations and rejections. Thus,
these rms are limited in the way in which they can reorganize their business plan in way in
which their bankrupt counterparts cannot.
We nd that an insolvent rm decreases the percent of cancelled ights by 8 percent while it
operates under protection, and increases it by 3 percent after emerging from bankruptcy, both
numbers relative to pre-bankruptcy levels. The percentage of ights with at least a 15 minute
delay upon arrival drops by 9 percent while the carrier operates under bankruptcy protection,
4We also considered baggage lost, mishandled, and/or pilfered, and oversold seats, as measures of an airlines
quality of service. However, for these measures, the data available from the data is not market specic, but
only carrier and year-quarter (or year-month) specic. Since the variation across markets is lost, it is not
possible to identify the e¤ect of oversales or lost baggages from confounding market e¤ects (e.g., luggages are
more likely to be lost in smaller/larger markets, etc).
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but returns to the pre-bankruptcy levels once the carrier emerges from bankruptcy. The age
of the eet (in years since delivery of the make/model), own by the insolvent rm, drops
9 percent while the carrier operates under protection, and remains lower after the carrier
emerges from protection. Overall, these results show that a rm operating in bankruptcy
might be able to improve the quality of its services only temporarily and while the rm
operates under bankruptcy. Once the rm emerges, the quality of daily operations return
to their pre-bankruptcy levels. The only change that appears permanent concerns the one
stemming from an investment in xed assets, the renovation of the eet.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview on the literature on
nancial distress and bankruptcy and product market competition. In Section 3 we describes
specic features of the U.S. bankruptcy code that have the potential to a¤ect product quality,
and we specically mention two sections of the Code that pertain to the airline industry.
Section 4 describes the data, how we measure di¤erent dimensions of product quality, and
denes the key variables in the analysis. Section 5 presents the empirical specication and
Section 6 discusses the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature Review
There is a vast theoretical literature on the interaction between capital structure and product
market competition.5 The empirical literature has validated this link with evidence on the
interaction between leverage decisions and product market prices (Chevalier, 1995a, 1995b;
Phillips, 1995; Dasgputa and Titman (1998); Pichler, Stomper, and Zulehner, 2008); and
the link between bankruptcy and product prices (Borenstein and Rose, 1995, and Ciliberto
and Schenone, 2010). Interest has extended beyond product market prices and has focused
on how capital structure choices impact corporate performance as measured by sales (John,
5See for instance, Titman (1984), Brander and Lewis (1986), Benoit (1986), Maksimovic (1988), Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1995), and Dasgputa and Titman (1998).
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Lang, and Netter, 1992; Opler and Titman, 1994; Hotchkiss, 1995; Campello, 2003, 2006),
and on the interaction between capital structure and the rms decision to enter and exit a
specic product market (John, Lang, and Netter, 1992; Kovenock and Phillips, 1995, 1997).
The theoretical literature has advanced and delved into the interaction between product
market quality and capital structure. The rst paper in this area is that of Titman (1984).
In this work, individuals are reluctant to buy from rms that might go bankrupt because
customers face a cost when the rm goes out of business. Maksimovic and Titman (1991)
develop this idea further in a model where customers, even if they do not face a cost when the
rm goes bankrupt, might still be averse to doing business with a highly levered rm because
the nancial di¢ culties that could arise from high leverage have detrimental e¤ects on the
rms incentive to honor its implicit contracts. One such contract is the rms agreement to
supply high-quality products. These two papers established a potential practical link between
the rms leverage and the quality of the products or services that the rms customers receive.
The empirical literature has yet to determine whether there is in fact an observed relation-
ship between a rms capital structure and the quality of its products. This paper contributes
to lling this gap, by exploring the e¤ects of a rms bankruptcy ling on the quality of the
products and services that it provides. Specically, we disentangle the e¤ect on the quality
and variety of the products provided by a bankrupt rm and its competitors, both during
and after bankruptcy.
Exploring the actual link between bankruptcy and product quality unveils a real cost of
bankruptcy to the customers of the insolvent rm which has so far remained vastly unexplored
in the nancial literature. Analysis of the costs of bankruptcy has focused on the direct and
indirect costs. Direct costs include bankruptcy proceeding fees, such as court and lawyer
expenses, as well as fees paid to accountants and expert witnesses. Indirect costs include the
change in the value of the estate during the bankruptcy process, as well as the time the rm
spends under bankruptcy protection. The latter has been used to proxy for a bankruptcys
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adverse impact on product markets as well as the capital markets (Franks and Torous, 1989,
and Thorburn, 2000). As Bris, Welch, and Zhu (2006) claim, this is a very noisy proxy for
the indirect costs of bankruptcy, adding to the controversy over the magnitude of indirect
bankruptcy costs. By precisely measuring the e¤ects of bankruptcy on product market quality,
we can cleanly measure one way in which a rms insolvency can have an adverse e¤ect on
the rms customers, thus allowing us to precisely measure a bankruptcys adverse impact
on the product market.
Our work is related to the empirical literature on the interaction between capital structure
and product market competition. Previous research has mainly focused on the link between
leverage decisions and product market prices (for example, Chevalier (1995a, 1995b), Dasg-
puta and Titman (1998), Pichler, Stomper, and Zulehner (2008)). Closest to us is the work
by Ciliberto and Schenone (2010), who investigate the e¤ects of bankrupt lings on airline
network structure, capacity choices, and prices. They nd that bankrupt airlines downsize
their national route structure as well as their airport-specic networks; and that bankrupt
airlines reduce their route-specic ight frequency and capacity. And consistently, prices
are not signicantly lower after bankruptcy. Our results complement those in Ciliberto and
Schenone: Since the quality of airline service drops following a carriers bankruptcy ling,
and such deterioration in quality is not compensated by any price reduction or increase in
the variety of services o¤ered, we suggest that consumers of a previously bankrupt rm are
worse o¤ after the rms bankruptcy ling. Our analysis di¤ers from these previous empirical
contributions to the literature on the relation between nancial distress and bankruptcy on
product market characteristics, since it is the rst paper that empirically measure product
quality and relates it to a rms bankruptcy ling.
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3 Bankruptcy in the Airline Industry
The United States Bankruptcy Code contemplates two alternative solutions for rms that are
in nancial distress and are ling for court protection: Chapter 7 (Liquidation) and Chapter
11 (Reorganization). Chapter 7 allows for an orderly, court-supervised procedure by which
a trustee collects the assets of the rm, reduces them to cash, and makes distributions to
creditors subject to the debtors right to retain certain exempt property and to the rights
of secured creditors. Chapter 11 allows the bankrupt rm to continue operating while the
rms management restructures its business. We focus on Chapter 11 lings and drop rms
ling under Chapter 7 because we are interested in the changes in the variety and quality of
the services provided by a rm that operates under bankruptcy protection, and rms ling
for Chapter 7 cease operations and liquidate their assets.6
A rm operating under bankruptcy protection can benet from provisions granted by
the United States Bankruptcy Law, such as creditor protection and greater exibility to
renegotiate and rescind contracts. For instance, under Section 1113 of Chapter 11, an airline
can unilaterally modify labor agreements if negotiations with employees and labor unions
are unsuccessful, and can terminate labor contracts it deems no longer needed. And under
Section 1110 of Chapter 11, the bankrupt rm can selectively reject leases on aircrafts and
freely return unwanted and outdated aircrafts to the lessor. These concessions allow the rm
to downsize, reduce capacity, and reduce the variety of products o¤ered shifting from the
least protable ones to the most protable ones, at a lower cost than what would have to be
borne outside of bankruptcy. As a consequence of this, the rm frees funds that might be
reallocated to improving the quality of the products that the rm continues to o¤er.
Rescinding leases. Rejecting leases on selected aircrafts frees up funds that allow the
carrier to reorganize its eet and to replace older aircrafts with newer, more comfortable, and
6For a more detailed description of the institutional details associated with bankruptcy lings in the airline
industry, see Ciliberto and Schenone (2010) and references therein.
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higher quality ones. Rescinding leases on airport facilities, such as gates and hangars, can
also free up funds so that the carrier can acquire bettergates that increase the e¢ ciency
with which the carrier can turn around the plane for the next ight, and lowering departure
and arrival delays. In sum, rejecting leases on aircrafts and gates lowers the cost of reducing
service (frequency and markets served), but can allow an increase in the quality of the services
that the carrier still provides.
Rescinding labor contracts. Rejecting labor contracts can have an ambiguous e¤ect on
the quality of services. If layo¤s result in a smaller workforce than needed to e¢ ciently
perform the daily operations of the rm, the carriers quality of service drops. But if layo¤s
allow the rm to replace entrenched and ine¢ cient personnel with a more e¢ cient workforce,
service quality increases. For instance, laying o¤ necessary gate agents and aircraft cleaning
crews can delay the process of boarding a ight, thus resulting in longer departure and arrival
delays for the late-in-boarding ight as well as for the ight that is incoming to that gate.
On the other hand, if the laid-o¤ gate agents were unnecessary for the rms operations, or
were entrenched and ine¢ cient employees that can now be replaced with more e¢ cient ones,
then there might be some improvement (or no e¤ect) in product quality.
4 Data Description
Our data is an original compilation from several sources. From the Air Transportation Asso-
ciation Web site, Lynn LoPuckis Bankruptcy Database, and Factiva and Lexis-Nexis reports,
we obtain the identity of carriers ling for bankruptcy, the dates on which each carrier en-
tered and exited court protection, and the specic way in which each carrier emerged from
protection.7 We merge this dataset with the data on product quality gathered from several
7The Bankruptcy Resrearch Database compiled by Law Professor Lynn LoPucki includes all Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases that satisfy the following two requirements. First, the debtor group ling for Chapter 11
protection must have assets worth at least $100 million at the time of ling (measured in 1980 dollars), as
listed in the last 10-K led before bankruptcy (provided that the 10-K is for a year ending within three years
prior to ling for bankruptcy). Second, the debtor group is required to le 10-Ks with the SEC. For airlines
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original sources: The On-Time Performance Schedule gathered by the Bureau of Trans-
portation Statistics (BTS); the T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported by the BTS; the
Web sites of aircraft producers (e.g., Boeing or Airbus);The International Directory of Civil
Aircraft; and the Aviation Consumer Protection Division(ACPD) of the Department of
Transportation (DOT). Table 1 describes the data sources, the units of observation, and
other characteristics in each dataset. Table 2 provides summary statistics.
Carrier Denition. We consider nine national carriers operating between 1997 and 2007:
American, Continental, Delta, America West (until the third quarter of 2005), Northwest,
TWA (until the second quarter of 2001), United, US Airways, and Southwest. We also
consider two low-cost carriers that had a strong presence during this period, Airtran and
ATA. We group the remaining low cost carriers into one category, LCC. The carriers in this
category are: Aloha Airlines, Alaska Airlines, Jet Blue, Independence Air, Frontier Airlines,
Florida Airlines, and YZ: LCC = fAQ; AS; B6; DH; F9; FL; Y V g. For each route-year-
quarter, we take the averages across the low-cost carriers for the control variables. Grouping
low-cost carriers in one category allows us to keep small carriers that are present in only a
few markets or for a few quarters when we include route-carrier xed e¤ects. Furthermore,
it allows us to use a meaningful grouping, capturing the impact of small carrierspresence in
the market.
Route Denition. We dene a route, denoted by r, as a non-stop airport-to-airport trip.
We consider all airport-to-airport pairs between the top 50 Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs), ranked by population size. Here a route is also a market, and we refer to them
interchangeably.
Bankrupt Carriers.We identify airlines that have led for bankruptcy protection between
1997 and 2007 from the Air Transportation Association Website, which provides a list of the
satisfying these requirements, we double check the ling dates, the type of ling, and the date of emergence
where available.
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names of air carriers that have led for bankruptcy protection, the date of the bankruptcy
ling, and the type of protection requested by the airline (Chapter 11 or Chapter 7). We
cross check this data with the Bankruptcy Research Database, compiled by Lynn LoPucki.
There are six carriers operating under bankruptcy protection during our sample period:
United Airlines (December 9, 2002 through February 2, 2006), US Airways (August 11, 2002
through March 31, 2003 and then again September 12, 2004 through September 27, 2005),
ATA (October 26; 2004 through February 28, 2006), Delta (September 14, 2005 through
May 1, 2007), and Northwest (September 14, 2005 through May 31, 2007). Some small
carriers operated under court protection for a small time window, and thus we cannot consider
these carriers independently (E.g., Independence Air operated under court protection between
November 7, 2005 and January 5, 2006).8
Unit of Observation. The unit of observation is a carrier-route-year-quarter. We denote
time periods by t = 1; :::T . For example, the combination jrt indicates that airline j (e.g.
American) transports its passengers on route r (Chicago OHare to Fort Lauderdale Airport)
at time t (e.g. the second quarter of 2002). Note that an important reason for using the airline
industry for our analysis is that airlines compete over many di¤erent routes and markets, and
over di¤erent time periods. Furthermore, a carriers competitors at any given point in time,
in one route, might not be the same competitors in a di¤erent route at that same time. For
example, United Airlines competitors in Denver-San Francisco in the rst quarter of 2001 are
not the same set of competitors United faces in the route between Dallas Forth Worth and
Newark in the rst quarter of 2001. Thus, a carriers business strategy in one route might
di¤er from its strategy on a di¤erent route. Therefore, even though we have six di¤erent
bankrupt carriers in the national domestic market, the strategic decision a carrier makes
in one route can di¤er from the one taken in a di¤erent route. This allows us to span the
8We exclude TWAs third bankruptcy even though it occured during our sample period because the rm
stayed under bankruptcy protection for less than one quarter. Furthermore, because we include route-carrier
and year-quarter xed e¤ects, this bankruptcy would be dropped in the econometric analysis.
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e¤ective number of rms (bankrupt and not bankrupt).9
4.1 Bankruptcy Categorical Variables
Several factors that can alter the competitive interaction between rms in an industry come
into play when one of the rms in the industry reorganizes under Chapter 11. First, the
bankrupt rm faces cost shocks inherent to operating under court protection, such as the
ability to renege and renegotiate contracts. At the same time, the bankrupt rm faces
demand shocks stemming from loss of consumer condence, which reduce demand for its
products (Opler and Titman, 1994).
We cannot capture cost related shocks using accounting data on costs because these report
exactly those liabilities which are renegotiated under bankruptcy, and hence do not reveal
exogenous cost shocks. Demand shocks are not observable. Therefore, to capture all of these
changes we use bankruptcy categorical variables. Below we summarize the information used
to derive and construct these categorical variables.
We dene the set K of carriers that led for bankruptcy protection at some point between
1997 and 2007 as K =

UA;US(1st); US(2nd); NW;DL; TZ
	
. Notice that US Airways led
for Chapter 11 twice.10 In the rest of the paper, we will use the subscript k = 1; :::;K to
denote a bankrupt rm (where K is equal to 6). Next, we discuss the variables that measure
the e¤ect of bankruptcy protection during and after the time when the rm is under Chapter
11.
During the Bankruptcy Filing. We want to distinguish the e¤ect that bankruptcy lings
have on the quality measures we consider, for the bankrupt rm, and for its competitors,
during the time when the bankrupt rm operates under Chapter 11, as well as after the rm
9 In fact, the literature on the airline industry (see for example, Berry (1990), Borenstein (1989), Brueckner,
Dyer and Spiller (1992), Berry and Jia (2010), and Gerardi and Shapiro (2009)) assumes that carriers make
decisions that are route specic as opposed to making nation wide decisions.
10During our analysis period, TWA led for bankruptcy for the third time. This ling lasted for less than
one quarter. Because of its brevity and because we include route-carrier and year-quarter xed e¤ects, we do
not include it in the analysis.
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emerges from bankruptcy protection. To measure these e¤ects, we construct the following
categorical variables. First, we dene Bktrt equal to 1 if there is at least one carrier under
bankruptcy protection at time t and that carrier provides service on route r, otherwise, Bktrt
is equal to zero. For each quality measure, we study the average e¤ect of bankruptcy across
markets and across bankrupt and non-bankrupt carriers.
After the Emergence from Bankruptcy. Next, we ask whether any observed price
changes during bankruptcy persist once the bankrupt rm emerges from court protection.
To do this, we dene the categorical variable AftBktrt equal to 1 if there is at least one
carrier that was under bankruptcy protection at a time before t; and that carrier currently
serves route r. Otherwise, AftBktrt is equal to zero.
Active Firm Categorical Variables. The presence of a bankrupt carrier in a route could
a¤ect the behavior of all other carriers in that market, regardless of whether or not that
carrier is under Chapter 11 protection. Without controlling for the presence of a carrier
that is bankrupt at some point in time, we cannot identify the e¤ect of a rm ks ling for
bankruptcy protection separately from the average e¤ect of that carrier ks presence. We
address this problem with categorical variables that capture whether a bankrupt or a to-be-
bankrupt rm is in the market: Inrt is equal to 1 if at least one bankrupt rm k is present
in route r at time t.
4.2 Quality of Products
In this paper we consider three measures that identify quality of airline service: Arrival
delays, ight cancellations, and aircraft age11. There are other measures of airline quality of
service, such as lost, pilfered and mishandled baggages and oversold ights, that we do not
employ in the econometric analysis, since this data is carrier-year-quarter specic and lacks
11There is a rich literature that studies the quality of airline service. Work by Headly and Bowen (1997),
Gourdin (1988), and Elliott and Roach (1993) considered as measures of airline service quality the average age
of the eet, the number of aircrafts, the percent of delayed arrivals and departures, the number of cancelled
and diverted ights.
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the market dimension. Such lack of market specic variation reduces the identication power
of econometric estimates. This will be discussed in further detail following the discussion on
the results we obtain for delays, ight cancellations, and aircraft age.
Flight delays We begin our study with an analysis of ight delays12. Data on ight delays
are from the On-Time Performance schedule gathered by the Bureau of Transportation
Statistics (BTS). Delays correspond to delays for reasons within the carriers control, as
well as those beyond its control. If one thought that any e¤ect on delays observed during
bankruptcy is related to reasons beyond the carriers control, such as weather delays, then the
distribution of bad weather in a market over time has to coincide with the times when there
is a bankrupt carrier operating in that market (this is, weather should always be worse for
ying during the times when some carrier is bankrupt). And this is highly unlikely.13 Arrival
delays are calculated as the di¤erence between the scheduled and the actual arrival times.
Delayjrt measures for every carrier j, ying route r; during year-quarter t, the number of
times that the carriers ights are at least 15 minutes late upon arrival.14 Table 2 shows
that on average, across markets and carriers, there are 58 ights per quarter that are at least
15 minutes late. Note that there are on average, across carriers and markets, 337 ights
scheduled and 292 ight departures, in a quarter.15
12Previous works have looked at the relationship between ight delays and the following variables: competi-
tion (Rupp, D. Owens and L. Plumly, 2006), market concentration (Mazzeo, 2003), aircraft capacity utilization
(Ramdas and Williams, 2009), airport congestion (Mayer and Sinai, 2003), stock price movements (Li, Lipson,
Ramdas, and Williams, 2009).
13Data on delays that are within the carriers control is available only after June 2003. This restricts the
sample period and excludes the rst bankruptcy ling by US Airways, as well as the beginning of United
Airlinesbankruptcy. We estimate regressions using both measures of delays and, not surprisingly, nd that
the results are statistically and economically similar.
14We only look at route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which we know that a carrier had at least 50
departed ights. This means that a carrier had to serve a route at least for a month and a half with at least
one ight per day.
15We do not have reasons to worry about any bias induced by left-censoring, since only 0:17 percent of the
route-carrier-year-quarter observations do not have even one ight that was delayed at least 15 minutes (the
number of zeros in the variable Delayjrt over the total number of observations in a route, by a carrier, in a
year quarter is 0.17).
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Flight cancellations Next, we consider ight cancellations as measure of quality of service.
Data on cancelled ights are from the On-Time Performanceschedule. Cancelledjrt is the
total number of times that carrier j cancelled a ight on route r during the year-quarter t:16 A
ight is considered cancelled by the BTS when it is listed in a carriers computer reservation
system during the seven calendar days prior to its scheduled departure but the ight was
not operated and did not depart.17 Table 2 shows that on average there are 8:377 ights
per quarter that are canceled. Notice that 23:32 percent of the route-carrier-year-quarter
observations do not have even one ight that was canceled. In this case, there is reason to
be worried about any bias induced by left-censoring. We will show results when we run a
random e¤ect tobit regressions and compare them with the results when we run a standard
linear random e¤ects regression. The results are identical, suggesting that in practice, left
censoring is not an issue for the analysis of this variable.18
Aircraft age The age of a specic aircraft, the overall condition of its cabin, and its safety
record is another measure of the quality of airline service. Older planes have been reported
to be less comfortable in terms of space, noise emission, cabin pressure, and entertainment
opportunities.19 We use the T-100 Domestic Segment Database of Form 41 reported by the
BTS to collect data on the specic aircraft type, make, and model that is own by carrier
j on route r during year-quarter t. We gather the date when each specic aircraft type was
rst delivered by the producer using data from the aircraft producers Web site. Missing data
in the aircraft producers Web site is completed using The International Directory of Civil
Aircraft.20 We compute the time span between the year when an aircraft of a particular
16For a study on the determinants of ight cancelations, see Holmes and Rupp, 2006.
17We only look at route-carrier-year-quarter observations for which we know that a carrier had at least 50
scheduled ights. This means that a carrier had to have a scheduled ight in a route at least for a month
and a half with at least one ight per day.
18Table 4, columns 11 and 12.
19For example, in Jet Blues eet of Embraers each seat is equipped with a monitor where passengers can
watch popular TV shows and live news updates.
20 In very few cases we used information from www.airliners.net.
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make and model was used on route r by carrier j, and the year when that particular aircraft
make and model was rst delivered for commercial ight. We denote this variable with
AgeAircraftjrt.21 Table 2 shows that on average planes are 20:46 years old. Notice that
only 0:03 percent of the route-carrier-year-quarter observations have a plane that is less than
one year old, so there is no reason to be worried about any bias induced by left-censoring.
5 Empirical Specication
We estimate regressions of these measures of variety and quality of service on two sets of
bankruptcy related categorical variables. The rst indicates whether a competitor in a market
currently operates under bankruptcy protection (BktOwnrt for the e¤ect of the bankrupt rm,
and BktOthersrt for the e¤ect on competitors). The second indicates whether any of the rms
competing in a market previously operated under bankruptcy (AftBktOwnrt for the e¤ect of
the ex-bankrupt rm, and AftBktOthersrt for the e¤ect of the competitors of the ex-bankrupt
rm). The latter allows us to distinguish whether the e¤ects of bankruptcy on the variety
and quality of an airlines service are temporary or whether they persist after the insolvent
rm exits bankruptcy. All of our specications control for heterogeneity across carriers and
airline routes with route-carrier xed e¤ects. To control for possible time shocks, we include
year-quarter dummies.
We develop a simple econometric specication that captures the in-bankruptcy and post-
bankruptcy e¤ects of a rms Chapter 11 ling on the quality of the products o¤ered by the
bankrupt rm and by this rms competitors:
lnQjrt = 
OWNBktOwnrt + 
OTHBktOthersrt (1)
+OWNAftBktOwnrt + 
OTHAftBktOthersrt + "jgt;
where "jrt is the remaining component of the regression to be discussed in detail below.
21Occasionally, carrier j ying route r during year-quarter t uses more than one aircraft type. In these
cases, we choose the oldest plane.
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Here, Qjrt is one of the measures discussed in Section (4.2): Delayjrt ; Cancelledjrt, and
AgeAircraftjrt: The coe¢ cient OWN measures the current e¤ect of a bankruptcy ling on
the bankrupt rms variable Qjgt, while OTH measures the current e¤ect on the bankrupts
rm competitors. The post-bankruptcy e¤ects are measured by OWN and OTHER, for the
bankrupt rm and its competitors, respectively.
Let "jgt be dened as follows:
"jrt = Inrt + o(r)Originrt  Trendt + d(r)Destrt  Trendt + ujr + ut + ujrt (2)
The rst component of "jgt is the variable that controls for whether one of the rms
that is ling for bankruptcy operates in route r at any point in time, Inrt. It is likely that
this variable is a function of the same unobservable that a¤ect the carriers quality choices,
introducing sample selection concerns. Route-carrier xed e¤ects, ujr; control for this type
of selection (Veerbek and Nijman [1992]). Route-carrier xed e¤ects also control for route-
carrier sources of heterogeneity. The idiosyncractic carrier-route-year-quarter unobservable
is captured by ujrt. The term ut represent year-quarter xed e¤ects that capture quality
changes triggered by demand changes stemming from seasonal (or other exogenous time
varying) shocks, such as weather variation, high/low travel season, increases in the cost of
fuel. This also capture any serially correlated industry-specic shock to demand. Finally, we
account for the possibility of persistent correlation between negative unobserved current and
expected demand shifts (that extend beyond the pre-bankruptcy period which we eliminate)
in markets served by the bankrupt airlines relative to that found in markets served by other
airlines. To deal with such market-specic unobservable correlations across time, we follow
Friedberg (1998), and include linear market time trends. The variable Trendt is a time trend.
Finally, o(r) is the parameter of the origin-specic time trend, where o is the origin airport
of route r. Similarly, d(r) is the parameter of the destination-specic time trend.
In the time period immediately proceeding the bankruptcy ling, the insolvent rm might
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take actions to avoid bankruptcy that it would not otherwise take. One such action could be
to attempt to increase prot margins by reducing the quality of the products o¤ered (under
the assumption that lower quality products can be produced at a lower price). If this where
the case, the bankruptcy indicator variables in our quality equations would be endogenous.22
To deal with such unobservable that are correlated with pre-bankruptcy quality and with
the rms bankruptcy ling, we follow the strategy used by Ashenfelter [1978]. In this work,
Ashenfelter noted that all trainees su¤ered unexpected earning declines in the year prior to
entering a training program (see Ashenfelter (1978, page 51)). Therefore simple comparisons
of earnings before and after the training program would be misleading evidence of the e¤ect
of training on earnings. To deal with this, Ashenfelter dropped the period immediately
preceding training (see Ashenfelter (1978, page 53)). In our case, a comparison of pre- and
post- bankruptcy quality levels would yield a dampened e¤ect of bankruptcy on product
quality. We follow Ashenfelters strategy and exclude the 2 quarters preceding bankruptcy.
In related work, Ciliberto and Schenone (2010) show that during bankruptcy, the distressed
carriers lower capacity, and reduce the number of national routes served, the airport-specic
route network (i.e., the number of ights served out of an airport), as well as lowering
the frequency of ights in a given route (the number of ights o¤ered in a given route
during a year-quarter). Such downsizing can a¤ect the carriers ontime performance and its
cancellation policy: With fewer ights serving a market, it might be easier to reduce arrival
delays and canceling ights might be a less attractive option. Therefore, if we observed
fewer arrival delays and fewer cancellations, this could be not due to an improvement in
quality per se, but to a lower frequency of ights and a reduced capacity. To disentangle
this capacity e¤ect from the bankruptcy e¤ect, we include the log of the number of departed
ights by carrier j, in route r, at time t; Log(Departed F lightsjrt) and the log of the number
22Recall the example of Beech-Nut during the mid 1980s. The rm was struggling nancially, and to keep
the rm from insolvency, management decided to knowingly continue buying adulterated juice from Universal
Juice Co. since this was 20% less expensive than real apple juice.
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of cancellations. If there is a change in arrival delays (or in cancellations) due to the reduced
service provided by the carrier, then these variables will capture this e¤ect and the bankruptcy
variables will be clean of the reduced service e¤ect.
In order to interpret the coe¢ cients of the dummy variables in the semilogarithmic re-
gression equation above we need to transform the estimates. This is because in a semilog
regression the coe¢ cient of a dummy variable, multiplied by 100, is not equal to the percent-
age e¤ect of that variable on the variable being explained. Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980)
show that to give the estimated coe¢ cient a percentage interpretation, we need to transform
the coe¢ cient as follows. If the estimated coe¢ cient is ^OWN then the percentage e¤ect of
BktOwnrt on Qjrt is ~
OWN = exp(^OWN )  1:
6 Results
Here we discuss the results concerning the e¤ect of bankruptcy on the quality of the products
that the rm o¤ers.
Arrival Delays. In Table 3, the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of arrival
delays of at least 15 minutes. Note that in all of these regressions we also include the natural
logarithm of the number of departed ights, Log(Departed F lightsjrt). Note these are not
scheduled ights, but the actual number of ights own by carrier j, in route r, during year-
quarter t. This variable will absorb any e¤ect on arrival delays that might arise from a change
in carrier js capacity, thus disentangling the e¤ect on delays of capacity reduction from the
e¤ect of change in the bankrupt rms operations.
Columns 1 and 2 report that the percentage of ights arriving at least 15 minutes late
for the bankrupt carrier falls by 9 percent while the rm operates under court protection,
but returns to its pre-bankruptcy level after the rm emerges from protection. Competitors,
instead, do not exhibit any change in the percentage of such arrival delays, although upon the
bankrupt rms emergence from protection their arrival delays increase by about 4 percent.
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These results are obtained when excluding the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy, and including
route-carrier xed e¤ects, year-quarter xed e¤ects, and origin and destination time trends.
Comparing these results with those in Columns 3 through 10 reveals the importance of
controlling for these unobservables. Specically, when we exclude year-quarter xed e¤ects
(Columns 3 through 10) we nd that the percentage of arrival delays longer than 15 minutes
increases rather than decreases both during and after bankruptcy, and for both the insolvent
rm and its competitors. This indicates that arrival delays have changed over time, and
therefore ignoring these time e¤ects results in biased estimates that confound the e¤ect of
bankruptcy on arrival delays.
In Columns 5 and 6 we exclude the origin and destination time trends, and nd that
these controls are important for identifying the e¤ect of bankruptcy on delays. Columns 7
and 8 add back the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy. Comparing the results in Columns 5
and 6 with those in 7 and 8; we nd that excluding the quarters before bankruptcy does not
signicantly a¤ect the results, thus suggesting that the bankruptcy categorical variables are
not endogenous in the regression on arrival delays. Finally, Columns 9 and 10 also drop
the route-carrier xed e¤ect and the results are similar to those in Columns 7 and 8.
The estimated coe¢ cient for Log(Departed F lightsjrt) shown in Columns 1 through 10
ranges from 1:04 to 1:09, implying that a 10 percent decrease in the number of performed
arrivals decreases by approximately 10 percent the number of ights arriving at least 15
minutes late.
Cancelled Flights. Next, we focus on ight cancellations as a measure of air travel quality.
In Table 4, the dependent variable for equation (1) is the natural logarithm of cancelled
ights by carrier j, in a market r, in a particular year quarter t. Again, note that in all of these
regressions, we add Log(Scheduled F lightsjrt); the log of the number of scheduled ights by
carrier j, in route r, during year-quarter t: The purpose of this control is to capture any
e¤ect that fewer ights by carrier j, in route r; at time t can have on the number of cancelled
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ights by that carrier, in that route, at that time, and hence the e¤ect of bankruptcy on
cancellations is clean from any confounding e¤ect that the downsizing which occurs during
bankruptcy can have on ight cancellations..
Columns 1 and 2 show that during a carriers bankruptcy, the insolvent rm drops
the number of cancelled ights by 8 percent relative to the number of cancellations pre-
bankruptcy. After emerging from bankruptcy protection, cancellations by the previously
insolvent carrier increase by 3 percent relative to pre-bankruptcy. The number of cancellations
by the non-bankrupt carriers in competition with the bankrupt carrier fall by 4 percent while
the insolvent rm operates under protection, but return to the pre-bankruptcy level after
the competitor emerges from protection. The positive e¤ect of bankruptcy on the number of
ight cancellations does not outlive the rms bankruptcy, and both the insolvent rm and
its competitors return to pre-bankruptcy levels or higher.
Results reported in Columns 3 and 4 are obtained excluding year-quarter xed e¤ects.
The in-bankruptcy results are larger in magnitude but they are in the same direction for
both the bankrupt and non-bankrupt rms (drop in cancellations); but the post-bankruptcy
results are in the opposite direction (decrease in cancellations). Comparing the results in
Columns 1 and 2 with those in 3 and 4 reveals that there are time-specic unobservable
e¤ects that, if uncontrolled, can confound the identication of the e¤ect of bankruptcy on
cancelled ights.
Columns 5 and 6 further exclude the origin and destination time trends that capture any
persistent correlation of cancellations over time within a market. The results are in the same
direction as in Columns 3 and 4 but much larger in magnitude, suggesting that there are
indeed origin and destination specic e¤ects that are correlated over time and which can
confound the e¤ect of bankruptcy (e.g., an airport located in a city that is in persistent
economic decline can become more ine¢ cient, leading to a greater number of cancellations
out of that origin airport, regardless of the carriers bankruptcy status).
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Columns 7 and 8 include the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy. The results are marginally
smaller in magnitude though in the same direction as in Columns 5 and 6. We therefore
conclude that bankruptcy might not be endogenous to ight cancellations. Columns 9 and
10 further exclude route-carrier xed e¤ects, and we obtain similar results. Columns 11 and
12 also include random e¤ects but now we run a tobit regression, allowing for left censoring
at 0. Remarkably, the results are identical to those in Columns 9 and 10, suggesting that
left censoring does not introduce a bias in our estimation.
We nd that the coe¢ cient on Log(Scheduled F lightsjrt) ranges from 0:89 to 0:92; sug-
gesting that a 10 percent decline in ights is correlated with a 9 percent decline in cancella-
tions.
Aircraft Age. The age of the aircraft can impact the travelers comfort (and possibly
safety) during the ight. The bankrupt carriers ability to selectively renege on aircraft
leases while operating under bankruptcy court protection allows it to rescind leases on older,
more ine¢ cient, and uncomfortable airplanes in favor of newer, more e¢ cient, and more
comfortable ones. There is plenty of anecdotal evidence of bankrupt carriers reneging their
lease agreements on aircrafts. For instance, during US Airways bankruptcy ling in 2002, a
U.S. bankruptcy-court judge gave US Airways relief from making any payments on 57 aging
jetliners it had parked in the desert after September 11.23 During its 2004 bankruptcy ling,
US Air agreed with General Electric Co. to defer lease payments on some aircrafts. The deal
also called for GE Capital Aviation to lease 31 new 70- and 90-seat regional jets to the airline
in the next 3 years and for the airline to return 25 of its larger older aircrafts24.
In Table 4, the dependent variable for equation (1) is the natural log of the maximum
number of years since the aircrafts rst delivery, Log(Age Aircraftjrt).25
23See The Wall Street Journal, August 14, 2002.
24See The Washington Post, November 27, 2004.
25Only the 0:03 percent of the observations had an age of zero. To avoid dropping them we added a 1 to
the age and then took the natural logarithm.
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While in bankruptcy, the bankrupt carrier employs youngerplanes: the maximum num-
ber of years since the aircrafts rst delivery drops 9 percent percent relative to pre-bankruptcy
(Column 1). The younger eet remains active even after the carrier emerges from bank-
ruptcy protection (Column 2). Non-bankrupt competitors cannot freely renege on their
aircraft leases in order to substitute older for younger airplanes and we do not expect to
see an improvement in aircraft age for these carriers. The results shown are consistent with
this. The age of the aircraft eet of the bankrupt carriers competitors does not signicantly
change: it marginally increases by 2 percent while the bankrupt competitor operates under
protection (Column 1) and returns to its pre-bankruptcy level once the carrier emerges from
protection (Column 2).
As with the previous results, we nd that excluding year-quarter xed e¤ects (Columns
3 and 4) signicantly biases the results, making the e¤ect of non-bankrupt carriers larger
in magnitude and statistical signicance (which would greatly increase the age of their eet
both during and after the carriers bankruptcy).
The results in Columns 5 through 10 are similar in magnitude and in the same direction
as those in Columns 3 and 4, suggesting that including the 2 quarters prior to bankruptcy
(Columns 5 and 6), excluding origin and destination time trends (Columns 7 and 8), and
excluding route-carrier xed e¤ects (Columns 9 and 10) can further confound the e¤ects
of bankruptcy.
The results we present here indicate that while product quality might improve during a
bankruptcy ling, the e¤ects do not persist after the rm emerges from bankruptcy. This is
true measures of quality that result from daily operations of the rm (e.g., delays and cancel-
lations). However, for changes in quality that stem from xed investments (e.g., investment
in aircrafts), the improvement in quality is persistent.
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7 A note on other quality measures
There are other quality measures one can think of concerning airline services: baggage mis-
handled, oversold ights, customer complaints, and frequency of accidents and incidents. We
collected this data.26 Baggage data comes from the Aviation Consumer Protection o¢ ce
(led with the Department of Transportations Bureau of Transportation Statistics). Bag-
gage statistics are on a monthly (or quarterly) basis, by U.S. carriers that have at least 1
percent of total domestic scheduled-service passenger revenues. Thus, these data are carrier-
year-quarter-month specic, but not market specic. Since the data are not market specic,
we lose an important degree of variation that allows us to precisely estimate the e¤ect of
bankruptcy on mishandled bags.
If we observe that during bankruptcy the number of mishandled bags per enplaned pas-
senger drops, or increases, we cannot disentangle whether this stems from the bankruptcy
ling, or from some year-quarter specic condition that disrupted baggage handling at the
same time that bankruptcy was underway (for example, the shock of September 11).
However, we study these data and nd that the mean number of mishandled baggages per
enplaned passenger across carriers, markets, years is 0:0053 for the sample of 611 carrier-year-
quarter observations for which there is a bankrupt carrier operating in the market and 0:0048
for the sample of 433 carrier-year-quarter observations corresponding to the post-bankruptcy
period. The di¤erence in means is not statistically signicantly di¤erent from zero.
Another measure of airline quality that one might be tempted to use is the number of
oversold seats: measured as the number of passengers who hold conrmed reservations and
are (voluntary or involuntary) denied boarding because the ight is oversold. Again, the
data on this measure are reported quarterly to the Bureau of Transportation Statistics, on
a carrier-year-quarter basis. Thus, again, we lose the market dimensionality that allows us
26Summary statistics as well as regression analysis using baggage mishandled, oversales, accidents, and
customer complaints is available from the authors upon request.
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to identify the e¤ect of bankruptcy on over-sales from confounding time specic e¤ects. If
we observe over-sales increase during bankruptcy, we would not be able to identify wether
this is a bankruptcy related e¤ects or an e¤ects related to a time specic boom/depression
in demand booming for exogenous reasons.
Still, we study this data and nd that the mean number of total passengers denied boarding
for the set of 212 year-quarter-carrier observations for which no carrier is currently operating
under bankruptcy is 0:0021, while the equivalent statistic for the set of 169 observations
for which there is at least one carrier that operates under court protection, is 0:0015. The
di¤erence of means is statistically and economically insignicantly di¤erent from zero.
Customer complaints could also capture quality of service. We collect data on the total
number of customer complaints, led with the Department of Transportation in writing,
by phone, via E-mail, or in person (it does not include safety complaints), who does not
determine the validity of the complaints. The data are not systematically gathered across
markets, years and carriers. And we therefore consider it too noisy to make any signicant
statistical inferences.
Finally, from the National Transportation Safety Board, we collected data on accidents
and incidents by carrier, on a year-quarter-market basis, from 1993 until 2006. We have
detailed data on the causes of accidents and incidents, and on the carriers response to these
events.27 Fortunately, there are too few accidents and incidents per carrier, year-quarter,
and market unit of observation that no signicant conclusions can be drawn. For example,
between 1993 and 2006, there are 18 fatal, and 275 non-fatal, accidents across all markets
and across all airlines. Given the large number of markets and ights serving these markets
over this 13 year time window, a total of 293 accidents is statistically negligible. Over the
27The National Transportation Safety Board denes accidents as an occurrence associated with the operation
of an aircraft where as a result of the operation of an aircraft, any person (either inside or outside the
aircraft) receives fatal or serious injury or any aircraft receives substantial damage. And it denes incidents
as occurrences, other than an accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft that a¤ects or could a¤ect
the safety of operations.
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same sample period, and across all markets and ights, there have been 275 incidents. Again,
a fraction too small relative to the total number of markets and ights to draw signicant
inferences.28
8 Conclusions
With the tightening of available credit following the Panic of 2007, several industries have
faced cash constraints that pushed rms into insolvency. This reignited the debate on the
e¤ect that bankruptcy has on di¤erent economic agents, one of them being the rms con-
sumers. What e¤ect would a rms bankruptcy have on the quality of the products that the
bankrupt rm o¤ers?
In this paper we use objective ways to dene measures of product quality for airline service:
ight cancellations, ight delays, and aircraft age. We nd that delays and cancellations are
less frequent during bankruptcy lings but return to their pre-bankruptcy levels once the
bankrupt rm emerges from Chapter 11. We also nd that rms use Chapter 11 lings to
permanently reduce the average age of their eet. We do not nd evidence of statistically
and economically signicant changes by the airlines competitors along any of the dimensions
above. There are other measures of product quality, such as mishandled bags, oversold seats,
customer complaints, and accident and incident rates, but these are either not market specic,
or there are too few observations to make signicant statistical (and economic) inferences.
Our work sheds light on the e¤ect of bankruptcy lings in other industries. For example,
General Motors (GM) recently led for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. Under bankruptcy, GM
shed brands such as Pontiac, Saab, and Saturn. Hence, consumers now have fewer choices.
Yet, it might be that GM will increase the quality of the brands it still produces (e.g., more
reliable and comfortable). Another example: Kmarts Chapter 11 bankruptcy (January
22; 2002). While restructuring, Kmart closed more than 300 stores in the U.S. and laid o¤
28Note that of the total number of 540 accidents and incidents, 9 have been at the airport and airport-related.
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about 34; 000 workers. At the same time it introduced ve prototype stores. These stores
were advertised as having wider aisles, improved selection, and better lighting. Kmart moved
towards fewer stores but better quality ones. Our analysis shows that customers should be
cautious about any e¤ective improvement of product quality: Neither GM nor Kmart are
likely to improve the quality of the products that they continue to produce. However, because
of the downsizing associated with the bankruptcy ling, GM and Kmart might shed their
worse quality products.
This paper also complements the work of Ciliberto and Schenone (2010) who show a re-
duction in the variety of products the bankrupt rm o¤ers while in bankruptcy and after
emerging from bankruptcy. Customers have less options to choose from and hence the dis-
tance from their preferred choice and the actual available options might increase. This shift
in business strategy is detrimental to consumers. Here we show a further dimension along
which customers are not better o¤ during or after a bankruptcy ling: For the products
that the rm continues to o¤er, quality does not improve, but rather worsens or remains at
pre-bankruptcy levels. The only signicant improvement we document is the one stemming
from changes that relate to investments in durable xed assets.
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Table 1: Data Description 
Panel A: Data Sources 
Data On Time Performance Scheduling Data Aircraft Characteristics 
Frequency By carrier, year, quarter (since 1993) By carrier, year, quarter (since 1993) For make/model reported in the scheduling data 
Market Specific? Yes Yes No 
Data Collected On-time departure and arrival.  
 
Aircraft configuration; Aircraft group (prop, turbo 
prop, 2, 3, 4, or 6 engines); Aircraft type (make 
and model). 
Year first ordered, year first flown, first and last delivery year. 
Source The "On-Time Performance" schedule gathered by 
the Bureau of Transportation Statistics (BTS) 
The T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 reported 
by the BTS 
Each aircraft producer’s website. Complemented with data from airliners.net, and 
data from "The International Directory of Civil Aircraft" 
Database Monthly data reported by US certified air carriers that account for at least one percent of domestic 
scheduled passenger revenues. 
"The International Directory of Civil Aircraft" contains detailed information on each 
aircrafts characteristics and history. 
Panel B: Variable definitions 
Arrival Delay 
 
Arr_Delay_15jrt and 
Log(1+ Arr_Delay_15jrt) 
By operating carrier, route, year, quarter. Arr_Delay_15jrt  is the is the total number of times 
that carrier j, flying in route r, during the year quarter t, arrived at the destination at least 15 
minutes late. Arrival delays are the difference between scheduled and actual arrival times. 
Actual arrival time: “The time the aircraft touches down upon arrival’. Scheduled arrival: “The 
scheduled time that an aircraft should cross a certain point (landing or metering fix)”.  
The "On-Time Performance" schedule data by 
the BTS 
Cancelled Cancelledjrt and Log(1+Cancelledjrt) 
By operating carrier, route, year, quarter. For the BTS a flight is cancelled when it is listed in a 
carrier's computer reservation system during the seven calendar days prior to its scheduled 
departure but the flight was not operated and did not depart. Cancelledjrt  is the total number 
of times that carrier j, cancelled a flight in route r, during the year quarter t. 
The "On-Time Performance" schedule data by 
the BTS 
Aircraft type Aircraftjrt  The aircraft type (make and model) used by carrier j to fly route r during year quarter t.  The T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 (BTS) 
Date each specific 
aircraft type was 
first delivered  
Delivery_Year_Aircraftjrt,   
The year a specific aircraft type (make and model) was first delivered by the aircraft’s 
producer. 
Aircraft producer's website, airliners.net, "The 
International Directory of Civil Aircraft." 
Aircraft Age 
Age_Aircraftjrt = t - Delivery_Year_Aircraftjrt 
 
By operating carrier, route, year, quarter. Maximum number of years since the aircraft’s (make 
and model) was first delivery. If carrier j uses more than one aircraft type in route r during 
year-quarter t, then: Max_Age_Aircraftjrt=max{AgeAircraftjrt}. 
Aircraft producer's website, airliners.net, "The 
International Directory of Civil Aircraft." And 
the T-100 Domestic Segment of Form 41 
reported by the BTS (Scheduling data).  
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics for the Market Competition Variables 
The reported numbers are averages across markets, carriers, and year-
quarter observations. 
 Mean S.D. 
Delays 
Number of Departed Flights that were 
more than 15 Minutes Late in a quarter 
 
58.077         56.038 
Cancelled Flights  
Number of Scheduled Flights that were 
canceled in a quarter 
 
8.377        17.404 
Age Aircraft 
Number of years since year of first delivery 
of the plane 
20.465     8.343 
   
Scheduled Flights 
 
337.474     292.035 
Departed Flights 292.355     260.30 
Number of Observations 175,692 
 
  
  
Table 3: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Delays 
The dependent variable is natural logarithm of the total number of times that carrier j, flying in route r, during the year quarter t, arrived at the destination at least 15 minutes late. Arrival 
delays are the difference between scheduled and actual arrival times. Actual arrival time is defined as “The time the aircraft touches down upon arrival”; and Scheduled arrival is defined 
as “The scheduled time that an aircraft should cross a certain point (landing or metering fix).”  Arrival delays do not include taxi in times.  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 During After During After During After During After During After 
           
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.09*** 0.00 0.02*** 0.21*** 0.03*** 0.21*** 0.05*** 0.21*** 0.05*** 0.22*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Effect on Rivals 0.01 0.04*** 0.07*** 0.24*** 0.07*** 0.20*** 0.07*** 0.21*** 0.08*** 0.20*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Departed Flights 1.04*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 
 (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Constant -1.78*** -2.44*** -2.39*** -2.36*** -2.24*** 
 (0.16) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
Observations 139,424 139,424 139,424 145,246 145,246 
Route-carriers 6,114 6,114 6,114 6,127 6,127 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No 
Time trends Yes Yes No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No 
Adj. R-squared 0.84 0.80 0.80 0.79  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 Table 4: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on Cancelled Flights 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total number of times that carrier j, cancelled a flight in route r, during the year quarter t. A flight is considered cancelled by the BTS 
when it is listed in a carrier's computer reservation system during the seven calendar days prior to its scheduled departure but the flight was not operated and did not depart. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 During After During After During After During After During After During After 
             
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.08*** 0.03** -0.16*** -0.08*** -0.26*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.17*** -0.20*** -0.16*** -0.20*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Effect on Rivals -0.04*** 0.02 -0.13*** -0.03** -0.21*** -0.14*** -0.18*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.13*** -0.19*** -0.13*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Number of Scheduled Flights 0.89*** 0.93*** 0.95*** 0.94*** 0.92*** 0.92*** 
 (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant -3.35*** -3.69*** -3.84*** -3.84*** -3.60*** -3.60*** 
 (0.04) 
 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Observations 143,267 143,267 143,267 149,229 149,229 149,229 
Route-Carriers 6,286 6,286 6,286 6,302 6,302 
 
6,302 
Random Effects No No No No Yes Yes 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No No 
 Time trends Yes Yes No No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No No 
Tobit (Left Censoring at 0) No No No No No Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.71 0.63 0.62 0.62   
Log Likelihood       -172435.28 
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 Table 5: The Effect of Bankruptcy Filings on the Age of Planes 
 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the aircraft’s (make and model) first delivery:  Data on the year a specific aircraft type (make and model) was 
first delivered by the aircraft’s producer is from Aircraft producer's website, airliners.net, "The International Directory of Civil Aircraft."  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 During After 
 
During After During After During After During After 
Effect on Bankrupt Firm -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.07*** -0.01 -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.06*** -0.08*** -0.05*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Effect on Rivals 0.02*** 0.01 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.03*** 0.09*** 0.02*** 0.08*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
Constant 3.69*** 2.90*** 2.91*** 2.91*** 2.80*** 
 (0.17) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Observations 175,692 175,692 175,692 175,692 175,692 
Route-carriers 8,604 
 
8,604 8,604 8,604 8,604 
Fixed/Random Effects FE FE FE FE RE 
Exclude 2 Quarters Yes Yes Yes No No 
Time trends Yes Yes No No No 
Year-quarter FE Yes No No No No 
Adj.  R-squared 0.71 0.70 0.69 0.69  
Standard errors in parentheses; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
